

# Cloudflare Remote Browser Isolation Overview

*DISA Technical Exchange Meeting  
11-June-2024*

- *John Kaden, Government Programs*
- *Scottie Ray, Senior Solutions Architect*
- *Tim Obezuk, Zero Trust Specialist  
Solutions Engineer*
- *Chase Disher, Product Manager*



# Agenda

Introductions

Cloudflare Network

Browser Isolation Overview

Demonstration

Questions

Closing



# Cloudflare Network Evolution



● Cloudflare city  
(As of Q1 2024)

## 310

cities in 120+ countries, including  
mainland China

## 13,000

networks directly connect to Cloudflare,  
including every major ISP, cloud  
provider, and enterprise


## 248 Tbps

global network edge capacity, consisting  
of transit connections, peering and  
private network interconnects

## ~50 ms

from 95% of the world's  
Internet-connected population


# Every service runs on every server, in every FedRAMP PoP



## Users connected via Anycast Routing

means requests can automatically be routed to a variety of locations ("nodes") without the end user or admin having to pick a destination

# Remote Browser in the Cloudflare Platform



# Browser Isolation

## Overview

*Tim Obezuk*

Update

## 8 high-severity Chrome zero day vulnerabilities so far in 2024


The web is a constantly expanding attack surface.

36% DoD of attacks are browser based.


Web browsers require constant patching.

Cloudflare Browser Isolation protects users from browser-based threats pre-and-post patch.

### Local browsing window of vulnerability




### Pre-patch protection with remote browser isolation




# Zero Trust Browsing: Threat defense

- Insulate users from untrusted web content
- Unique, superior **Network Vector Rendering (NVR)** technology
- Low-latency, high-resolution rendering using Network Vector Rendering (NVR)
- Compatible with all major browsers





# Legacy Browser Isolation Technologies




# Secure & Performant Remote Browsing Architecture

Remote Chromium-based remote browser

Local HTML5 client accessed via existing browser

Vectors over the wire, insulated from active website content

Malware isolated to isolated container



Patented technology [US10452868B1](#)

# Network Vector Rendering Advantages

## Security

Sanitized SKIA instructions sent to WASM client  
Underlying website source is never sent to endpoints

## Compatibility

No website compatibility issues  
Future proofed for emerging website technologies

## Performance

No encoding latency, near-native redraw performance

## Bandwidth


Lower bandwidth than pixel pushing and local browsing

## Clientless

Supports existing HTML5 compatible browser on workstation

```
SkPaint fillPaint; SkPaint strokePaint;  
strokePaint.setStyle(SkPaint::kStroke_  
Style); strokePaint.setStrokeWidth(3.0f);  
canvas->drawRect(SkRect::MakeXYWH(
```

*Skia code fragment*



# Integration & Deployment Models

## Existing user browser

Chrome / Edge

Firefox

Safari

*Any modern HTML5 browser*

## Forward proxy

Proxy Connect Endpoint (PAC file)

Endpoint Client

Layer 3: IPsec / GRE / PNI


## Reverse proxy

Prefixed URL

Identity-aware App Proxy

Email links via MX record

# Life of an Isolated Request



# Global Chromium Isolation Chamber

**Low latency** and **local** by default

Users can connect to remote browsers in any location, from **any location**

Scales **globally**, minimizing latency

Ephemeral Chromium containers executed in globally distributed **KVM** infrastructure



*Real world snapshot of RBI locations served - June 7, 2024*

# Roadmap

## Browser Extension

Support phish-resistant MFA to internal applications through a browser extension

## Enhanced Logging

Provide additional monitoring capabilities around user actions and policy enforcement in the dashboard

## DLP Integrations

Allow users to apply DLP policies which trigger isolation based on response data

2024 H2

2025 H1

## Isolate traffic based on on-ramps

Additional controls to all isolation policies based on the on-ramp into the edge (e.g. WARP vs. clientless)

## Disable Screenshots

Prevent users from taking screenshots of sensitive data within protected applications

## Extension Allowlist

Whitelist extensions in the browser

## Sensitive Data Obfuscation

Mask or redact sensitive information in-line based on DLP profile detection



# Demonstration



# Questions

# Appendix

## Resources

[Blog: RBI Technical Deep Dive](#)

[Whitepaper](#)

[Developer Documentation](#)

[Demo Access](#)

## Contacts

John Kaden, [johnk@cloudflare.com](mailto:johnk@cloudflare.com)  
Director, Federal Programs

Tim Obezuk, [tobezuk@cloudflare.com](mailto:tobezuk@cloudflare.com)  
Specialist Zero Trust Solutions Engineer


Chase Disher, [cdisher@cloudflare.com](mailto:cdisher@cloudflare.com)  
Product Manager, Zero Trust Solutions

Abe Carryl, [abe@cloudflare.com](mailto:abe@cloudflare.com)  
Group Product Manager, Zero Trust Solutions

Scottie Ray, [scottie@cloudflare.com](mailto:scottie@cloudflare.com)  
Public Sector Solutions Architect

Tim Kroeger, [tkroeger@cloudflare.com](mailto:tkroeger@cloudflare.com)  
Sr. Manager, Public Sector Engineering & Incubation

# IAP Locations Proximity to Cloudflare PoPs



IAP Proximity to Cloudflare PoP	
Warner Robins (GA)	Atlanta, GA
Columbus (OH)	Columbus, OH
San Antonio (TX)	San Antonio, TX
North Island (CA)	San Diego, CA
Pentagon (DC)	Reston, VA
Hampton Roads (VA)	Norfolk, VA
Yokota (Japan)	Tokyo, JP
Ramstein (Germany)	Dusseldorf, DE
Stuttgart (Germany)	Frankfort, DE
Hickam (HI).	Honolulu, HI



# Area 1 - Email Link Isolation



**Area 1 Email Link Isolation** *via* **Remote Browser Isolation (RBI)**


**What** **How**

# To block or not to block...

Organizations struggle to efficiently handle suspicious/unknown email links without compromising security or productivity

**Block** and potentially obstruct legitimate business activity

**Allow** and potentially expose the user to malicious content



## Which leads to...

Greater risk:

- **Multi-channel phishing attacks** that target users via email and web
- **Deferred phishing attacks** that weaponize an email link post-delivery

More effort:

- Manually managing policies and exceptions
- Manually investigating suspicious links and false positives







## Suspicious website ahead

<https://demo.area1.red>

You clicked on a link that may not be safe. If you trust it and want to proceed, we recommend opening the website in an isolated browser to improve safety. ([learn more](#))

**Avoid typing any passwords or personal details**







Open in an isolated browser

[Open link directly](#) *(not recommended!)*



LINK DEFENDER

# Email sequence

						
<b>1. Email Inspection</b>  Cloudflare Area 1 inspects inbound email and applies threat intelligence to classify as malicious, benign, or suspicious	<b>2. Link Isolation</b>  If classified as suspicious, link is rewritten to a custom Cloudflare prefix URL	<b>3. Email Delivery</b>  Email is delivered to intended inboxes	<b>4. Time-of-Click Check</b>  Once user clicks on rewritten link, system does a time-of-click analysis	<b>5. Interstitial Page</b>  If link is still classified as suspicious, then interstitial page is displayed	<b>6. Isolated Browsing</b>  When user clicks 'Open Remote Browser', an isolated browser session loads in closest PoP on the Cloudflare network	